2009-12-08

reading list nov 2009

2009-11-02

What Tsien (Qian) said during the crazy year of Great Leap Forward 钱学森写过些什么?

我本无意在今天为钱学森先生辩护或是要追究什么,毕竟这不是我本分的事情。个人以为,钱当时很可能不知道亩产高是意味着要按比例上缴的(我以前就没弄懂这点)。而且,无论钱的论证如何,他明确的指出了假设和前提,在科学和事实上并没有明显的错误或是使之受指责有违心之嫌。再说,这大灾难的帐应该算到政治决策者和体制头上,而不该要一个工程师(注1)的一篇文章为3000万条人命负责。这是当我只看到1958年文的时候的想法。毕竟,彭德怀发现大跃进的恶果也是1959年的时候了,1958年的钱,其地位和信息远不及彭的耳目灵通。

可是,当看到有人竟然把钱先生和戈培尔相提并论, 不由得多花了点时间搜了一下。是不是还有对钱不利的证据呢?在那疯狂的年代,钱发表了三篇文章。中国青年报文是第二篇。第三篇是1959年8-9月发表的,(应该写于之前吧,庐山会议上书是在1959年7月14日)。大家留意最后一段的黑体字,钱特别强调了理想值和理论值,并提出了接近(不是达到)理想值的可能途径。然后钱进一步的区分了充分和必须条件。(这严谨的逻辑可能是作为工程师或科学家的职业惯性,也可能是他意识到他是在踩一条细线。每人可以自行理解。假如我是毛,我会理解成钱实际是为达不到“丰产”做出了解释)。假如有人要相信毛是受了钱的影响而对亩产万斤深信不疑的话,毛是否该对钱举出的通风障碍投入研发解决呢?过分的非难钱,是否有为毛转移责任之嫌呢?

既然发生了讨论,还是该把事实都摆在眼前。因此我把三文附上。(第一篇,发表在1958/4/29人民日报,附在最后。因为愚见以为最后一篇应该代表他比较新的观点)

With hindsight,钱可能该有伯仁因我而死之省希望他给公众一个交代也是合理的。可是,钱一生没有公开为此道歉过,因此我们无法知道他内心的真实想法,是否心怀歉意。我个人倾向于性本善论,和presumed innocent 的原则。不过,对于宽容和厚道的度,因人而异。我无意也没有必要去把自己的标准强加于人。

related:  本乃驚弓之鳥 豈是文章殺人

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注(1):钱学森是火箭工程师,主要是研究火箭燃料流体力学和工程控制的。不是“核物理”学家。两弹一星,他的贡献主要在“一星”(包括东风和长征火箭,洲际导弹),不是原子弹氢弹,那是邓稼先的贡献,虽然钱可能有参与行政领导。(这是根据钱的履历和论文题目推论出来的。)

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 后记: 看到毛的辩护士这样写, “据李锐在《反思大跃进》一文中记载,毛泽东的秘书田家英问毛泽东:“你也不是没当过农民,你应当知道亩产万斤是不可能的”。毛泽东说:“这是我看了大科学家钱学森的文章,才相信的。” 我想知道,毛是什么时候承认亩产万斤是不可能的?田家英向毛提问在什么时候?之前除了彭还有谁问过毛这个问题?你真的相信毛当时觉得彭在说谎吗?据说田是1958年就问毛的,就是说毛在整彭之前就知道事实了,明知而往,其责不可能在钱。

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1) 《中国青年报》1958年6月16日第四版

“前年卖粮用萝挑,去年卖粮用船摇,今年汽车装不了,明年火车还嫌小!”。
这是江西井冈山农民的一首民歌。我们的土地正在农民双手豪迈的劳动中,付给人们更多的粮食,6月12日青年报第一版上发表了一个动人的消息:河南省遂平县卫星农业社继小麦亩产二千一百零五斤以后,又有二亩九分地平均每亩打下了三千五百三十斤小麦。

土地所能人们的粮食产量碰顶了吗?
科学的计算告诉人们:还远得很!今后,通过农民的创造和农业科学工作者的努力,将会大大突破今天的丰产成绩。因为,农业生产的最终极限决定于每年单 位面积上的太阳光能,如果把这个光能换算农产品,要比现在的丰产量高出很多。现在我们来算一算:把每年射到一亩地上的太阳光能的30%作为植物以利用的部 分,而植物利用这些太阳光能把空气里的二氧化碳和水分制造成自己的养料,供给自己发育、生长结实,再把其中的五分之一算是可吃的粮食,那么稻麦每年的亩产 量就不仅仅是现在的两千多斤或三千多斤,而是两千多斤的20多倍!

这并不是空谈。举一个例:今年河南有些特别丰产试验田要在一亩地里收一百六十万斤蔬菜。虽说蔬菜不是粮食,但到底是亩产一百六十万斤!

所以,只要我们有必需的水利、肥料等等条件,加上人们的不断创造,产量的不断提高是没有问题的。今天条件不具备,明天就会创造出来,今天还没有,明天一定会有!


2) 農業中的力學問題--知識就是力量 1959年8-9月
(a subtitled of "10,000 catty per acre is not a problem"  was erroneously added in many internet fora, but i cannot find such a subtitle in the scanned source archived at Boxun. I am interested in where this subtitle first appeared)
 (不知道谁替钱加了一条副题,"農業中的力學問題--畝產萬斤不是問題",我在原文看不到该副题,希望读者能帮助解答。还有,我找到的扫描并不完整,好像最后缺了几句的样子。还有一件怪事,就是网上引该文的都到3.9万斤或43立方米为止,没有一个网页引用最后一段的。)



钱学森:农业中的力学问题

这几年来,中国人民在党的建设**总路线的光辉照耀下,精神振奋,意气风发,无论在工业战线、农业战线上,都取得了很大的成就;特别是1958年大跃进以来在同一设备条件和土地上,生产量提高了许多倍。由于这种生产上飞跃的发展,也就出现了一连串新的科学技术问题,要求科学工作者去解决。我在这里想提出其中一个问题,就是农业高额丰产技术中的力学问题。

——我们都知道,力学是处理机械设计的问题的,是处理高速飞机设计问题的,是处理水流和气体流动问题的,怎么农业高额丰产里也会出现力学问题呢?要说明这一点,我们得先计算一下在我国平均纬度的地方,一年之中在每一亩地上到底有多少太阳光落在上面。这个能量可以用各种单位来表现。我们这里选用从水和二氧化碳制造出碳水化合物的斤数来计算,这是因为植物的生长正是利用水和二氧化碳来制造淀粉和纤维这样碳水化合物的。我们算了一下,一年中落在一亩地上的阳光,一共折合约94万斤碳水化合物。如果植物利用太阳光的效率真的是百分之百,那么单位面积干物质年产量就应该是这个数字,94万斤!

——自然,高等植物叶子利用太阳光的效率不可能是百分之百,估计最高也不过是1/6,这就是说,单位面积干物质的年产量大约是15.6万斤。但是植物生长中所积累的物质,只有一部分粮食,像稻、麦这一类作物的谷粒重量,约占重量的一半,所以照这样算来,单位面积的粮食的年产量应该是7.8万斤。这是说全年三百六十五天都是晴天。如果因为阴天而损失25%,那么粮食的亩产量应该是5.85万斤。这是说,作物要在全年都生长,如果仅在暖季才长,也许要再打一个 2/3 的折扣,那么平均亩产量是3.9万斤了。

——同样的计算也可以用来估计快速丰产林木的数字。这里相当于粮食的是蓄材量,也就是每年每亩地上的积累的木材重量。如果是常绿树,全年都长,每亩地的积累的木材重量是5.85万斤;如果是落叶树,就是3.9万斤。倘若木材属于轻质的,重量按每立方米900斤计算。那么全年都长的常绿树,每亩每年可以积累木材 63立方米,而落叶树每亩每年可以积累木材43立方米

前面所计算的单位面积年产量,无论是粮食或是木材都是理想的极限量。要接近这个指标,必须通过密植,套种等措施,使地面终年充满了足够的绿叶,充分利用太阳光能量。其他如水,肥,土种 ,保等一切条件都得配合得十分理想。也就是由于这个缘故,在目前的农业实践中,还没有达到这样的高额丰产。可是我们从一些高额丰产试验田的情况来看,要真的接近这样的丰产极限,必须先解决一个农业中的新问题:通风问题。要实现超高额丰产,必须推行高度密植,而高度密植却带来了通风的困难。如果二氧化碳,空气都不流通,植物也就不能充分利用太阳光。农民科学研究员,陕西省乾县烽火人民公社社长王宝京搞的田间设计学,研究如何排列田间作物群体来解决通风透光问题,道理也就在这里。通风也就是气体的流动和传输。这正是流体力学的一个好题目。虽然流体力学在近50多年有了非常迅速的发展,但那都是着重在高速气流一方面的。上面所说的,在茎叶间的气流速度却非常慢。。。。。。(后面一页哪去了?anyone has the rest of the article?)

3) 中国航天之父——钱学森1958-04-29在《人民日报》的文章,是知识精英应走的路!

我回到祖国已经差不多有两年半了。在这两年半中间,我对于在中国作科学研究工作是有着不少错误的看法的。
发挥集体智慧,排除个人主义,没有克服不了的困难,在我刚回到中国来的时候,单凭过去在美国的经验,觉得自己以前也搞过一些像发展液体火箭、超声速飞行 器、高速燃烧稳定等开创先例的工作。在当时,这些问题是没有解决的问题,没有老师可以请教,要自己去摸,从不懂摸到懂,从没有理论去摸索、去创造理论。

回到祖国,根据从前在国外的一些经验,我十分乐观:心想只要有党和政府的支持,作点科学研究,解决一些工程技术问题,是毫无问题的事。党号召十二年赶上世 界先进水平,我当时心里想,怎么这么慢 ,那会要十二年!很显然,那是我无知的时期,不知天高地厚。后来研究计划定下来了,真要动手作研究了,这才逐渐感到困难重重,既没有研究工具,也没有研究 设备。同时我也想,既然有领导的支持,那么就让我们来动手作吧,来设计、创造研究设备吧。可是连这也干不了,为什么呢?因为没有研究队伍,金工厂也没有。 这时候,我的思想转了一百八十度,从乐观一变而为悲观,真是觉得作科学研究寸步难移,简直急死人。其实这正是我的学习时期,可以说比刚一开始 懂得了一点,知道了一些实际东西,可是知道得还不多。我不知道在艰苦的环境中奋斗、找出路,怎样白手起家。现在想起来,出路明明白白地摆在那儿,办一切事 业的唯一好办法,包括科学研究在内,就是发动大家、依靠大家。从一个研究所的范围来讲,所谓大家,就是全所的人员,全所的研究和行政事务人员 。我们能和大家一起动手,那么做一天就会有一天的成绩,不会做的事也可以学,因为作错了也可以学乖,今天不会的,明天就会了。发动大家这件事看来简单,但 对个人主义者来说,也就是对我这样具有资产阶级思想的人来说,却是不容易做到的。因为有了个人打算,要 和人比高低,就会把劲头用错地方,不用在解决研究问题上去,而是用在一天到晚筹划个人划。这样当然达不到真正的团结,人与人之间有了隔阂。当我们考虑问题 的时候思想上就走不到一处,就没有法子发挥集体的智慧。这个问题表现在很多的地方,例如:年青的研究人员怕年长的研究人员;而年青的却不知道,年长的也怕 年青的,最 好不找他们。高级研究人员之间也是这样,讨论问题时,心里先就作一个防备,生怕自己漏了,漏出毛病来,让另外一位同志看见了丢脸,将来也许不能保持自己的 威信。真是思想上顾虑重。

所内常常看到一些研究人员愁眉苦脸,觉得压力很大。正在这个时候,我们的党提出了整风的号召,整风运动开始后,跟着就是反右派,搞干部下放 ,然后是查五气、反浪费、反保守,这么一来,我们这些知识分子都认识了自己资产阶级错思想之所在,也看清了昨日之我如何可恨,今天非痛改不可。这就是说每 一个人的思想觉悟都大大地提高了,大家的眼光、目标都转到六亿人民的事业上去了!所以,我相信在这次整风运动以后,每一个人都会表现出一番新的气概,从前 的那些困难也一定会一扫而空。只要我们能够附上工人阶级的皮,我们就可以跟六亿人民在一道,我们的力量真是无穷无尽,绝对不会有什么克服不了的困难。所以 我现在又恢复了两年多以前的高度乐观。我觉得科学的跃进要乘风破浪,这是完全可能的。现在谈科学规划,应该把眼光放远 ,既然如此,我们就应该把眼光放远些,看看在比较长的时期内,我们有些什么问题。举个例来说,我们应该注意到,从农业发展纲要四十条提出来以后,全国农业 合作社的社员们生产情绪高涨。尤其在去冬以来,在党的领导下,真是排山倒海。估计这四十条可能在七年或者更短一些时间就可以实现。在科学研究上,七年的时 间不是一个太长的时间。我们现在应该想想,农业发展纲要四十条的内容统统实现以后,下一步又要干什么?要干的事,在科学研究方面应作好准备,到时候我们就 能跟得上去。在这一点上,我是外行。作为一个搞力学的人来说,不免总是从能量方面来考虑。最近我算过这么一个粗浅的账,就是地球上一个单位面积上,受太阳 的能有多少。假设我们说一 天太阳光照在地面上,只照八小时,一年三百六十五天,八小时太阳光照上去,如果我们只计算1%的能用来转变为植物有效利用的能,这个能把水和二氧化碳转变 为淀粉,那么就可以在一亩面积上年产约八千市斤的淀粉。当然这里面有许多问题,不是那么简单。但我们可以向这个方向去考虑。关于农业生产方面还有许多问 题,如人工气象的控制等。当水利方面已经实现农业发展纲要规定的指标的时候,就可以基本上免除不太大的自然灾害。但比较大的自然灾害,如台风,是不是就不 能控制呢?这也是一个值得研究的问题。再说我们的农业动力问题,在这方面看来一个重要的解决途径是所谓生物能的利用,也就是使粪便和杂草?酵产生沼气。这 个过程基本上是炭水化合物的分解,分解后产生的东西差不多一半是沼气,一半是二氧化碳。如用这种混合气体当然不太好烧,沼气虽然是很好的燃料,而二氧化碳 不是很好的动力燃料,它夹杂在里面只会减低燃烧速度。因此,就要想出办法把沼气和二氧化碳分离,用纯沼气作为内燃机的动力,这就可以解决我们缺乏石油资源 的困难。同时,二氧化碳也有用处。二氧化碳对植物来说是一种肥料,是不是能考虑在暖房里把空气中充上二氧化碳,使植物的生长可以更好一些。同时二氧化碳可 以用来培养小球藻,而小球藻又含有相当多的蛋白质,至少是很好的饲料,可以喂猪。像这一系列的问题,就不仅是农业机械化、电气化、化学化的问题,而是把工 程技术、自然科学知识怎样应用到农业上去,使农业生产也成为一个工厂似的,在控制的条件上来生产。这也可叫作农业的工业化。这个问题需要相当长的时间才能 解决,是高度综合性的,其中有各方面的问题,差不多各个研究部门都同它有关。

也许有的同志会这么想:这些新技术,今天我们来谈是不是太远一点?今天在全国大跃进的形势下,我们的思想很容易落在现实的后 面。我们国家里的事情总是走得很快,而科学研究不应该是生产的尾巴,应该走在生产的前面。所以讨论科学规划的时候,应当从长计较 。各门科学要互相支援、互相渗透,使科学能全面发展中国科学院最宜于发展学科之间的新科学,譬如说物理就应该渗透到各个部门中去。现在提出的生物物理,就 是一门很重要的科学。同时我们也应该考虑怎样使自然科学、技术科学渗透到社会科学部门。例如:能不能让近代数学的方法和计算技术为工程经济和工业经济 服务?在以前因为计算太多,分析有困难而不去做的问题,有了新方法就能做了。自然,数学只是一个工具,用了它不是去改变社会科学而是去帮助社会科学的发 展。在高潮中跃进在我们党的领导下,经过整风以后,全国掀起了一个大跃进的高潮。在这个高潮中,我们每个人也受到了很大的鼓舞。从前看起来不能做到的事, 现在也能做到了。我们科学工作者不仅有我国六亿人民的支持,只要我们把我们的心掏出来,把心交给党,交给人民,我们科学事业的大跃进是一定的。

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 钱学森在美国的老师冯.卡门关于钱学森的回忆

我的朋友钱学森是我1945年向美国空军科学顾问组推荐的专家之一。他是当时美国处于领导地位的第一流火箭专家,后来变成了世界闻名的新闻人物。钱学森作为加州理工学院火箭小组的元老,曾在二次大战期间对美国的火箭研究作出过重大贡献。

美国情报机关无视钱学森的学识、名望以及对美国的贡献,1950年指控他是外国共产党分子,硬说对他所居留的国家构成危害。当他打算动身回归中国时,被移民局逮捕,关押在拘留所里两个星期。随后,违背他的意愿,被滞留在美国达五年之久,经常受到被放逐的威胁。1955年,他在饱尝不公正待遇的辛酸后,收拾行装,返回祖国。美国实际上并无真正站得住的理由,就把最出色的一位火箭专家奉送给了红色中国。

美国这一悲剧是如何发生的呢?钱学森出生在上海,在他称为古老中国庄严中心的北京长大。在那里,他进入一所专为富有才能的青年设立的中学。接着去上海交通大学攻读机械工程。1935年,他考取庚子赔款公费留学,前往美国,在麻省理工学院取得硕士学位。1936年的一天,他来征询进一步进行学术研究的意见。这是我们第一次见面。我抬头看到一位个子不高、仪表严肃的年轻人。他异常准确地回答了我的所有问题。他思维的敏捷和富于智慧,顿时给我以深刻印象。我建议他转到加州理工学院来继续深造。

钱同意了。他在许多数学问题上和我一起工作。我发现他非常富有想象力,具有天赋的数学才智,有成功地把数学与自然现象中物理图像结合在一起的非凡能力。作为一个青年学生,他帮我提炼了某些思想,使一些很艰深的命题变得豁然开朗。这种天资是我所不常遇到的,因而他和我成了亲密的同事,并很快引起学院其他教授们的注意。

钱喜欢到我家作客。由于他饶有风趣的见解和诚挚直率的风度,我妹妹总是很欢迎他的到来。他丰富的想象力和各种新颖的思想,使我们倾服。记得在试验导弹的早期日子里,钱意识到导弹日益增长着的重要性:半开玩笑地建议在美国设立一个喷气式武器部,在那里应能集中力量研制导弹。他当时指出,这里的技术同其它类型武器所要求的完全不同,必须委托给军事部门的一个新团体,要用新的军事思想和思想方法去进行研究。后来证明这是非常正确的。他甚至还建议我们成立一个学会来促进喷气推进技术。

对实现加州理工学院的喷气助推起飞研究计划,钱有过重大贡献。后来,他接受我的邀请,参加了空军科学顾问组。

在加州理工学院的校园里,钱并不是最为一般人爱戴的教授,因为他严厉、性情急躁,对学生显得有点傲慢。不过,我认为对于学生来说,同他接触,了解一下他如何对待和处理技术问题是颇有益处的。他对我一直非常尊敬,虽然我们已经成为亲密的朋友,他还是用那种古老的中国方式称呼我为“尊敬的老师”。在中国。

这也许是一个人给别人的最高赞词。1947年2月,我愉快地推举他为麻省理工学院正教授。

此后不久,钱收到从中国的来信,说他的母亲去世了。他决定回祖国去安抚年迈的父亲。这是他12年来第一次回国。几个月后,在一封长信里他十分详尽地告诉我他在祖国见到的人民贫困和痛苦。当时那里是在国民党人手里。信的结尾他顺便告诉我,他已经和一位名叫蒋英的姑娘在上海结婚,准备把她带来美国。她是一位具有歌唱家天才的可爱的世界主义者,曾在柏林研究过德国歌曲,后来在苏黎世接受一位匈牙利女高音歌唱家的指导。钱爱好音乐,看来他很幸福。我也感到高兴,他终于找到一位具有国际知识的妻子。

有一件事他没有提及,是我后来听说的,他在中国时,曾拒绝接受要他担任交通大学校长职位的聘请。

他值五个师:

在麻省理工学院执教两年左右后,钱又回到加州理工学院,担任喷气推进课程的戈达德教授以及丹尼尔和弗罗伦斯8226;古根汉姆喷气推进中心的领导人。实际上他在1949年已经写过第一篇关于火箭技术(sunbun: 没有“核”火箭这种东西,应是译误)的出色论文,至今仍被认为是这个领域中的一篇经典性名著。

这时,在美国,以麦卡锡为首对共产党人实行了全面追查。在全国掀起了一股驱使雇员们效忠政府的歇斯底里狂热。加州理工学院,这所素有维护许多奇特的、独立的科学家名声的小小加州学府,不可避免的会受到注意。凡是于1936年至1939年期间在加州理工学院生活过的人,都有披视为四十年代中不可靠分子的危险。

一天,怀疑终于落到了钱的身上。事情可能是这样开始的:当时要他揭发一个名叫西德尼8226;槐因包姆的化学研究负,此人曾在一起与共产主义有关的案件中提供过伪证而正在帕沙迪纳受审。钱同他有过一般交往,为他介绍过职业,还曾去过他家欣赏古典音乐。

钱拒绝揭发他的朋友,1950年7月间,军事部门出乎意外地突然吊销了钱参加机密研究的证书。

钱的自尊心受到了严重伤害。他去找加州理工学院院长李8226;杜布里奇,申明失去了接触机密正书,他根本无法继续进行喷气推进的研究。他感情激动地说,宁肯回中国老家去,也不愿在受人怀疑的情况下继续居留美国。杜布里奇安慰他,希望他保持镇静,建议他对这个决定提出申诉。但是,钱并不想提出申诉,因为他感到,正像他的许多朋友遇到的那样,在当时的气氛下,一个异邦的中国教授不会有多大希望打赢这场官司。何况钱又是那么骄傲,他并不认为他必须向当局证明他不是一个共产党人。

当钱的接触机密证书被吊销时,我正在欧洲。我从杜布里奇院长那里听到这消息后,即刻写信给钱,表示我的震惊,并告诉他我将为他做我能做的一切。许多重要人物出来声援钱。但无济于事。

钱会见过丹尼尔8226;金布尔。金布尔作为海军次长,对钱在喷气推进中心承担的研究计划负责。钱告诉金布尔,如果不恢复他的证书,他打算回中国去。但是毫无结果。这样,钱就定下决心,打电话给这位次长,说他已经准备动身了。

金布尔十分激动,随即通知了移民局。事后他私下对我说,这是因为怕钱回到中国使共产党人得到美国喷气推进研究的军事机密。然而,后来事情竟然这样快地变糟,我想金布尔也会感到惊奇甚至震惊(据外电报道,丹8226;金布尔曾说过:“我宁肯把他枪毙,也不愿放回中国,无论在什么地方他都值5个师。”——校者注)。移民局不仅搜查他,粗暴地对待他,还在特米那岛上的拘留所中把他拘留了14天,直到收取了巨额保释金以后才释放了他。

后来事情竟发展到了极点。海关没收了他的行李,包括800多公斤书籍和笔记本。他们硬说其中有机密材料。全世界各国的报纸都刊登新闻说:一名“共产党间谍”企图携带机密文件离开这个国家。当然,这都是谎言。事实上我听说,钱是足够正大光明的。在他打包以前,曾把所有资料交克拉克8226;米利根检查过。接着,帕沙迪纳的美国检查官在审查了钱的所有材料之后,辨明钱是无罪的。

可是,1950年10月,移民局根据麦卡锡法案,发布一项放逐令,宣称钱是一名外国共产党分子,因为他在1947年非法地再度进入美国。这样一来。这位仅仅在两年前还获得过美国政府最高赞扬的骄傲而有教养的人,发现自己不仅完全处于被迫害的境地,而且处于被抛离这个国家的危险之中。

终于回国钱变得十分阴郁。他已经不能集中精力去研究技术问题了。

我和我的所有同事都确实相情,钱并不是共产党员,最多不过曾同某些后来被认出是共产党员或共产党同情者的人有过一般社交关系,移民局捕风捉影的证据是全然不可信的。曾经有好几种说法。我的朋友马勃教授告诉我,其中一个说法是:

两名洛杉矶警官说他们曾经在其形容为共产党员登记卡片上,见到过钱的名字,但却不是钱本人的笔迹。“似乎还提出过其他疑点。

马勃教授还告诉我,一位共产党教授曾被要求提供证明,证实钱是共产党。最初这位教授拒绝作证,他说对饯的指控是不真实的。后来他被起诉,政府威胁他说,因提供伪证罪他将被判处四年徒期。他旋即改口,作了“伤害性”供述,说他“设想”钱是一名共产党人,在一次所谓共产党会议上好象看见过钱。

帕沙迪纳移民局下令驱逐钱出境,甚至带有威胁地诣往说,如果钱不承认是共产党员,就要判他以伪证罪。作为事情的完结,钱被滞留美国长达五年,以致中国公开发表声明,谴责美国政府在违背本人意愿的情况下监禁了一个中国公民。

拘留钱的目的,是要使他当时所掌握的一切知识变得陈旧过时。钱继续在加州理工学院执教,但必须每月向移民局作一次汇报。对他来说这是一种屈辱。他从未放弃口中国去的打算,因为他觉得,只有中国在真正营救他,而且在那里他会得到应有的礼遇。

钱学森、他的妻子蒋英以及他们的两个孩子于1955年离开了这个回家。有传闻说,他是与一个红色中国手里的盟军俘虏在华沙进行了交换,但我并不认为这是真的。无论如何,中国政府乐于请他回到中国。于是,美国火箭技术领域一位最伟大的天才,我的一位杰出学生,就这样交给了共产党人。

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2009-10-06

The "world" 3000BC-1215AD

East Asian Map by Year: 2000BC to 1600 AD


source: 中国東アジア歴史地図
currently there are still some gaps: 300-100BC, 1215-1580AD, 1600-2000AD.


Here is another map animation I found in youtube, but the part about Korea seems a bit strange.

2009-10-04

Uncritical reading



I have commented on how uncritical reading could sway you previously. (btw, certain apple daily columnist continues to defend the-rapist, even till today, apparently idiots are everywhere in our corwded city)

There is another example today, via Chinasmack

1) from a comment in this post (perhaps also represents some 'widely held' misunderstanding among western media and uncritical readers)
  • Domestically, Jiang was well known for his incapability since he handled miserably in diplomatic affairs (Yinhe Incident in 1993, Third Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1996 and NATO bombing of the PRC embassy in 1999). He failed to defend China’s interests. The two Prime Ministers in his cabinet were targets by sides from both inside and outside the party. The first PM, Li Peng, earned his bad name by ordering crackdown on Tiananmen Square and the second PM, hardliner Zhu Rongji was hated by many for his tough administrative style (tempest reform on state-owned enterprises which resulted in soared unemployment, and brash rectification on banking system).
Wait a minute, who was Zhu hated by? many??? corruptor Chen Xitong or those princelings benefited from Jiang/Li era corruption who are now abroad and got a hand on influencing the western media?

The danger of taking a very small sample when you do your reporting.

2) I was going to say people never linked Jiang and Zhu together, but then Chinasmack promptly put up a follow up post (bravo chinasmack!!!), about netizens lamenting on Zhu's jaded silver hair vs Jiang's dyed brown head. You only need to take a couple sample (well, it is a 100% one-sided opinion from netizen up to this minute) to see comments like this
  • "NND, why does National Day still need to give Jiang so many shots??? It should give our ex-Premier Zhu more shots instead, as everyone misses the old man more!"
  • 哎!说什么好呢!只是朱总理在位的时候搭错了班子。但人民永远怀念您!
If something you heard does not feel right, just go to the forum and check the comments. Democracy works pretty well in the internet.

p.s. here is an exercise, blogger yang hengkun said, "60年前,美国政府对是否要打朝鲜战争举棋不定,这时,美国著名的智库兰德公司搞出了一个“可行性报告”,但他们不给美国政府看,要一大笔钱才肯出卖。可美国政府又舍不得花钱,就拒绝". This doesn't seem right. The US government wouldn't pay for a RAND report? unlikely but i could take this, but such a report could change a government decision? give me a break! the exercise is easy to do, try google for RAND and Korean War, see if you could verify Yang's story at all.

A Full Historical Map Series of the World

This is a GREAT site, perhaps the greatest historical map site. Though in Japanese, it is largely comprehensible for those who can read Chinese characters (Kanji), better if you can spell Katagana as well.

It has the maps of the world (well, Euroasia for the period it has been able to cover up to this date -- AD1215 when Mongolia was united by Temujen aska Genghis Khan), spaced at 5 year intervals (and at 50 years for B.C.). I believe it is still a work in progress and more maps will be filled for the period between 1215 and 2000.

Animation for such country evolution will be treated in future posts. It is especially useful to understand the periods of 16 states and N&S (i.e. 300-600AD) and that of 5 Dynasties 10 States (900-1000AD).

I have selected a few of its maps here for illustration

1000 BC: Shang dynasty

550BC: the year of Confucius and the Buddha, Persian Empire expanding, while China and India were still divided

200BC: India and China both united

5AD: Palestine/Israel under Roman Empire, Han close to its peak after defeating the Huns

210AD: Immediately after the Battle of Chibi, Liu Bei acquired the State of Jin (Hubei today)

690AD: The Empire of Da Zhou (Wu Zetian, the first woman empress in China, interlaced in Tang Dynasty), the peak of any Chinese empire. The map here is a bit dubious, as it included tribute states such as Japan and part of India (Indus River, today's Pakistan, which I think is a bit of a stretch)

790AD: when the Tibetan Empire was at its peak (I bet not many people are aware of Tibet's brilliant footprint in history. Given the harsh environment it originates and the small population, the Buddhist Theocracy probably conquered a larger area (per original ethnic population) than Genghis Khan's empire did.)

880AD: Dali Empire (capital at today's Lijiang/Dali area) at its peak


2003AD: the 2000 onward are on a year-by-year basis. you may think nothing interesting is happening, but look at the two areas with Stars and Stripes flag across these years

It also has very nice series of maps for Africa, East Asia and Europe (years covered are still to be completed, but impressive enough to overwhelm any maplover)

Enjoy!

Map: dynasties in China

These animations show the different dynasties and states that had been established in the land of China in the past.

These mainly used map resources from outside China (e.g. wiki japan), and represents the "lower bound" of the territories, especially in the north (Siberia)


These use some Chinese map sources, and tends to include the northern area, which though paying tribute to the emperor, was mostly tribal. (and I do not under where the Tang#5 map is from, likely from this site)


These are from Chinese source (mostly likely all based on a PRC Historical Map published in 1996, which was great (7 Vol, Edited by Tan Qishuang), except for the minor nuisance of "political correctness")


related: Curzon's various maps of historical evolution

2009-10-03

PRC's National Anthem from the original movie

From movie "Children of the Troubled Times" (Feng Yun Er Nuu), the clip is from the end of the movie, when the hero joined the Volunteer Army in Manchuria to fight the Japanese Occupation (at the time Manchukuo). It was in 1935, after the 9-18 but before 7-7 incidents.

March of the Volunteer


Related link: Frog in Well

2009-10-02

Happy 35th!

China's 60th Anniversary national day - timelapse and slow motion - 7D and 5DmkII



1984 -- Happy 35th!


1949-2009 -- 35 years of Achievement
  • 1949-1956 = 7 years; 1978-1989= 11 years, 1992-2009 = 17 years -- the middle years were essentially wasted
  • Bard DeLong, "And in 1978 China had its first piece of great good luck in a long, long time--perhaps the first time some important chance broke right for China since the end of the Sung dynasty. China acquired as its paramount ruler one of the most devious and effective politicians of this or indeed any age, a man who was quite possibly the greatest human hero of the twentieth century: Deng Xiaoping. Deng sought to maintain the Communist Party oligarchy's control over China's politics while also seeking a better life for China's people, and he is guided by two principles: (i) be pragmatic ("what matters is not whether the cat is red [sic - should be "Black"] or white, what matters is whether the cat catches mice), and (ii) be cautious ("cross the river by feeling for the stones at the bottom of the ford with your feet")."

  • 然后,在交了长年累月的霉运(可能自从宋朝完结后中国在主要的机遇上就从来没有什么事情是顺的)之后,在1978年中国终于迎来了她的第一个硕大无比的好运。中国获得了这时代,甚至可以说是任何时代里,最难得最有效的政治家 -- 一个很有可能是20世纪人类最伟大的英雄:邓小平,作为她的最高领导人。
    邓一边寻求维持工程队对中国政治的寡头控制,一边为中国人民追求对生活的改善。而他遵循着两项原则:
    (i)务实:不管白猫黑猫,能抓老鼠就是好猫
    (ii)小心:摸着石头过河
Happy 35th, Xiao Ping Ning Hao!

Update: forget CCTV, Guardian's reporter made a stunting video, to download paste the video link to this site, then right click the 'download' link there.

2009-09-29

Oh media and opinion leaders

They are biased. Of course they are.

When the PRC government cleaned up its corrupted official, they would discredit any possibility that certain government(s) in this world, however authoritative or generically corrupted, would want to become less corrupted. Instead, they cooked up some conspiracy theory of power struggle to confuse its reader. If they hate you, whatever you do it is just wrong.

But to think that they are against China is "too simple, sometimes naive", to quote the ex-prez Jiang. To the "main stream media" and so-called opinion leaders, plus the foreign ministers of two major European countries, if they love you, you can rape a young teen brutally and their loves are still eternal.

As for media in Hong Kong, they simply applied google translation for whatever they have received and spit out to their readers (of similar caliber, they would think). They would not bother to read the comment fields under those websites, or a few lonely critical minds such as this.

What could China do to move from the "bad guy" circus to the "good side"? Here are a few tips from this lesson
  1. Be rich and famous
  2. Be-friend those western opinion leaders who had sold their souls
  3. Open the comment field
It is quite straightforward which way is the more achievable.

2009-09-26

The Continental Shelf Extension claims in East Asia

By now all countries have submitted their claim on UNCLOS, which states
  • The continental shelf is defined as the natural prolongation of the land territory to the continental margin’s outer edge, or 200 nautical miles from the coastal state’s baseline, whichever is greater. State’s continental shelf may exceed 200 nautical miles until the natural prolongation ends. However, it may never exceed 350 nautical miles from the baseline; or it may never exceed 100 nautical miles beyond the 2,500 meter isobath (the line connecting the depth of 2,500 meters). Coastal states have the right to harvest mineral and non-living material in the subsoil of its continental shelf, to the exclusion of others. Coastal states also have exclusive control over living resources "attached" to the continental shelf, but not to creatures living in the water column beyond the exclusive economic zone.
The claims can be found here and here.
Japan's continental extension claim focuses on the souther part of its EEZ claim (i.e. lower half of this map)

Consisting of 5 major areas:
  • SKB Shikoku Basin, the large vertical strip south of Shikoku Island and north of the Okinotori 200 nm circle.
  • The area between Ogasawara/Iwo Jima (OGP) and the Minami-tori Shima (island) 200 nm circle (MTS)
  • KPR, the area between the Okinotori circle and Palau's 200 nm EEZ boundary (potential overlap)
  • 2 smaller pieces ODR and MIT to the east and west of the Okinotori circle



A very nice map for Chinese and Korean claims can be found in the red firefly blog (a very nice map blog in Chinese)
  • The orange area is the co-development zone (1st phase) reached by China and Japan a year ago
  • The green area is the Joint Korea-Japan Fishing Zone
  • Blues lines are the 200 nm lines for Korea and China
  • KOR1-KOR5 are sample points (joined into a line) of Korean claim
  • D1-D4 are sample points of Chinese claim
  • Both the KOR and D points are where the continental shelf end at the Okinawa Trough

Here is the technical definition of China's calim
  • A -- the base-point (land territory) where the claim distance starts to count (usually an island close to the continent)
  • B -- 200 nm line
  • C -- continental shelf slope start to fall (FOS), point of maximum change in gradient
  • D -- deepest point when continent shelf falls to the trough (lowest sea level)

Note that China's "preliminary example point" has carefully avoided to overlap with Korea claim points, apparently for a few reason (that I can think of)
  1. To avoid controversy with Korea
  2. To have Korea on its side over a potential rebuff from Japan (Japan's argument may be quite weak given the fact that it also submitted similar claim to the other side of its ocean)
  3. The example points are only "examples" to establish the Okinawa trough as the boudary, China can then negotiate with Korea (if the trough is established) regarding how to divide the trough between them, most likely it would be the equidistant principle which is not far from D1/KOR1

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Related:

2009-09-15

ROC's provincial division for China

ROC's provincial plan 1951 (source: map can talk blog)
Chiang Kai-shek published this plan, dividing China into 68 provinces, more or less splitting the provinces into 2 each. I guess he was trying to use this to rally support for his plan to "re-capture the continent", because he could then have more "feudal" areas to award to those who help him in the war.

The KMT government has never really ruled the Northeast (Inner Manchuria), so the 9 provinces in NE is only known to Chiang's bureaucrats. When the soldiers he brought to Taiwan need to register for the home provinces, none of them knows which "province" they are supposed to come from.

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Below is the ROC territorial claim in 1910s, well actually Dr. Sun Yat-sen's negotiation position then. This, and the rail map in the previous post, were published in Dr Sen's book called Plan for the New Country (建国方略).


  • this is the "upper bound" for the Manchu empire, including vassal countries such as Indo-china, Korea, and some far fetched ones such as Sulu Islands and Malaya (There are discussions on how Sulu became Qing vassal in the Taiwan blog but I have no idea why Dr. Sun thought Malay peninsula was a legitimate claim)
  • with that view Thailand became a "enclave" country

China Rail Map (planned)

Sun Yat Sen's vision on China's Rail network

2008 Planned Rail network map

2008 Planned Rail -- West side of Taiwan Strait

Dr. Sun Yat-sen's map was done circa. 1910s. Dr. Sun worked on this immediately after the revolution when he had to give up the power to Yuan Shikai to get his support for the revolution.

It was based on the ROC territory (e.g. Tannu Tuva and Outer Mongolia are included but Taiwan is not, because there had no treaty ceding Tannu/Mongolia) or the Qing Empire territory prior to the 1911 revolution. It was mostly based on desk work -- so the network is much denser in a relative sense for sparsely populated areas such as Mongolia and Tibet, while Hainan is a void in rail track.
  • For Dr. Sun's view on China's territorial claim see my next post
The 2008 plan will more likely to be realized (except the rail crossing the Taiwan Strait seems to be a one-sided wishful plan). There is even a map for the West Strait (Fujian) area anticipating the strait tunnel links, in which 3 lines were considered for reaching Taiwan, the northern lines (to Hsinchu and Taichung) are shorter while the southern (via Penghu) looks more pragmatic but the sea bed is much deeper.
  • Dark lines represent existing rails
  • Red line planned rais
  • Broken (red) line are rail for which there is still no solid plan yet
  • Dotted line are existing rails to be upgraded
Bonus: America's 2050 Rail Plans

2009-09-14

China Lake



I suppose the "World" Achipelagoes in Dubai is well known by now. Do you know there is also a "China Lake"? (Source and details/history in comment #9, btw, this is a great map blog, by a pro-green blogger in Taiwan)

The exact location is here.

2009-09-13

"Politicially Correct" map for PRC


This is the "official map policy" published by the PRC Bureau of Map, for drawing a politically correct map, literally.

1) As expected, the territorial boundary needs to be correct, i.e NE at the junction of Ussuri and Heilongjiang/Amur, North-West at Pengchi River, South at Zengmu of Spratly/Nansha, and a few other specifications, including Diaoyu, Taiwan, etc.
  • The new demarcation with Russia may change the NW and NE points

2) Be diplomatic on the Kashmir issue: do not take side, use white color, show Actual Control Lines, do not mark "capital city" since control still in dispute

3) Romanized name for places do not have to use Pinyin in HK/Macau/Taiwan. But for some city names in Outer Manchuria need to put the Chinese names in bracket

4) New roads/bridges are "state secrets" -- this is probably made obsolete with the introduction of google map

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公开地图内容表示若干规定

第一章 总 则
第一条 为了维护国家主权和利益,正确反映国家版图的内容,加强地图管理,规范地图编制,提高地图质量,依据《中华人民共和国测绘法》、《中华人民共和国地图编制出版管理条例》和国家有关法规,制定本规定。

第二条 各种载体表现的公开地图和地图产品,必须遵守本规定。

本规定所称公开地图和地图产品,包括各种类型的地图出版、印刷以及产品上附有示意性地图图形的工艺制品、地球仪等。

第三条 公开地图和地图产品上不得表示下列内容:

1.国防、军事设施,及军事单位;

2.未经公开的港湾、港口、沿海潮浸地带的详细性质,火车站内站线的具体线路配置状况;

3.航道水深、船闸尺度、水库库容、输电线路电压等精确数据,桥梁、渡口、隧道的结构形式和河底性质;

4.未经国家有关部门批准公开发表的各项经济建设的数据等;

5.未公开的机场(含民用、军民合用机场)和机关、单位;

6.其他涉及国家秘密的内容。

第二章 比例尺、开本、经纬线

第四条 公开地图的比例尺、开本应符合以下规定:

1.中国地图比例尺等于或小于1:100万;

2.省、自治区地图,比例尺等于或小于1:50万;直辖市地图及辖区面积小于10万平方千米的省、自治区地图,比例尺等于或小于1:25万;

3.市、县地图,开幅为一个全张,最大不超过两个全张;

4.省、自治区、直辖市普通地图(集、册)(内容以政区为主),开本一般不超过32开本;

5.香港特别行政区、澳门特别行政区地图、台湾省地图,比例尺、开本大小不限;

6.教学图、时事宣传图、旅游图、交通图、书刊插图和互联网上登载使用的各类示意性地图,其位置精度不能高于1:50万国家基本比例尺地图的精度。

第五条 比例尺等于或大于1:50万的各类公开地图均不得绘出经纬线和直角坐标网。

第三章 界 线

第六条 中国国界线画法必须按照国务院批准发布的1:100万《中国国界线画法标准样图》以及根据该图制作的其他比例尺中国国界线画法标准样图绘制。中国地图必须遵守下列规定:

1.准确反映中国领土范围。

(1)图幅范围:东边绘出黑龙江与乌苏里江交汇处,西边绘出喷赤河南北流向的河段,北边绘出黑龙江最北江段,南边绘出曾母暗沙(汉朝以前的历史地图除外);

(2)中国全图必须表示南海诸岛、钓鱼岛、赤尾屿等重要岛屿,并用相应的符号绘出南海诸岛归属范围线。比例尺等于或小于1:1亿的,南海诸岛归属范围线可由9段线改为7段线,即从左起删去第2段和第7段线,可不表示钓鱼岛、赤尾屿岛点。

2.正确表示中国国界线与地貌、地物、经纬线、色带等要素之间的关系,正确标注国界线附近的地理名称。

第七条 中国示意性地图必须遵守下列规定:

1.用实线表示中国疆域范围,陆地界线与海岸线粗细有区别,用相应的简化符号绘出南海诸岛范围线,并表示南海诸岛以及钓鱼岛、赤尾屿等重要岛屿岛礁;

2.用轮廓线或色块表示中国疆域范围,南海诸岛范围线可不表示,但必须表示南海诸岛、钓鱼岛、赤尾屿等重要岛屿岛礁;

3.比例尺等于或小于1:1亿的,可不表示南海诸岛范围线以及钓鱼岛、赤尾屿等岛屿岛礁。

第八条 世界其他各国之间的界线,参照由国家测绘局认定的最新世界地图集表示。

第九条 中国历史疆界,参照由外交部和国家测绘局认定的中国历史地图集表示。

第十条 省、自治区、直辖市行政区域界线依据民政部、国家测绘局制定并报国务院审批的行政区域界线标准画法图表示。

第四章 有关省区及相邻国外地区地图

第十一条 广东省地图必须包括东沙群岛。

第十二条 海南省及南海诸岛地图表示规定:

1.海南省全图,其图幅范围必须包括南海诸岛。南海诸岛既可以包括在全图内,也可以作附图。以单幅表示南海诸岛地图时,应配置一幅“南海诸岛在中国的地理位置”图作附图,海南岛的区域地图,也必须附“南海诸岛”地图;

2.南海诸岛附图的四至范围是:北面绘出中国大陆和部分台湾岛,东面绘出马尼拉,南面绘出加里曼丹岛上印度尼西亚与马来西亚间的全部界线(对于不表示邻国间界线的专题图,南面绘出曾母暗沙和马来西亚的海岸线),西面绘出河内;

3. 南海诸岛作为海南省地图的附图时,附图名称为“海南省全图”;作为中国全图的附图时,一律称“南海诸岛”;

4. 专题地图上,南海诸岛作附图时,正图重复出现时,附图也要重复出现,不得省略。必须与正图一样表示有关的专题内容;

5. 东沙、西沙、中沙、南沙四群岛以及曾母暗沙、黄岩岛必须表示并注名称。大于1:400万的地图,黄岩岛应括注民主礁,即:黄岩岛(民主礁)。比例尺过小时,可只画岛礁符号,不注岛礁名称;

6. 南海诸岛与大陆同时表示时,中国国名注在大陆上,南海诸岛范围内不注国名,不在岛屿名称下面括注“中国”字样。在不出现中国大陆的南海诸岛局部地图上,在各群岛和曾母暗沙、黄岩岛等名称下括注“中国”字样;

7.南海诸岛的岛礁名称,按照1983年国务院批准公布的标准名称标注。

第十三条 新疆维吾尔自治区表示规定:

新疆维吾尔自治区地图和绘有新疆维吾尔自治区西部的地区图,其图幅范围西部应绘出喷赤河南北流向的河段。

第十四条 香港特别行政区、澳门特别行政区表示规定:

1.香港特别行政区界线必须按1:10万《中华人民共和国香港特别行政区行政区域图》表示,比例尺等于或小于1:4000万的地图可不表示其界线;

澳门特别行政区地图内容必须按1:2万《中华人民共和国澳门特别行政区行政区域图》表示;

2.在分省设色的地图上,香港界内的陆地部分要单独设色;

澳门自关闸以南地区和氹仔、路环两岛,要单独设色。比例尺等于或小于1:600万时,可在澳门符号内设色;

3.香港特别行政区、澳门特别行政区图面注记应注全称“香港特别行政区”、“澳门特别行政区”;比例尺等于或小于1:600万的地图上可简注“香港”、“澳门”;

4.香港城市地图图名应称“香港岛·九龙”;澳门城市地图图名应称“澳门半岛”;

5.表示省级行政中心时,香港特别行政区、澳门特别行政区与省级行政中心等级相同;

6.专题地图上,香港特别行政区、澳门特别行政区应与内地一样表示相应的专题内容。资料不具备时,可在地图的适当位置注明:“香港特别行政区、澳门特别行政区资料暂缺”的字样。

第十五条 台湾省地图表示规定:

1.台湾省在地图上应按省级行政区划单位表示。台北市作为省级行政中心表示(图例中注省级行政中心)。在分省设色的地图上,台湾省要单独设色;

2.台湾省地图的图幅范围,必须绘出钓鱼岛和赤尾屿(以“台湾岛”命名的地图除外)。钓鱼岛和赤尾屿既可以包括在台湾省全图中,也可以用台湾本岛与钓鱼岛、赤尾屿的地理关系作插图反映;

3.台湾省挂图,必须反映台湾岛与大陆之间的地理关系或配置相应的插图;

4.专题地图上,台湾省应与中国大陆一样表示相应的专题内容,资料不具备时,必须在地图的适当位置注明:“台湾省资料暂缺”的字样;

5.台湾省的文字说明中,必须对台湾岛、澎湖列岛、钓鱼岛、赤尾屿、彭佳屿、兰屿、绿岛等内容作重点说明。

第十六条 与中国接壤的克什米尔地区表示规定:

1.克什米尔为印度和巴基斯坦争议地区,在表示国外界线的地图上,必须画出克什米尔地区界范围线和停火线,并注明“印巴停火线”字样;

2.表示印巴停火线的地图上,应加印巴停火线图例;

3.在印度河以南跨印巴停火线注出不同于国名字体的地区名“克什米尔”;

4.印巴停火线两侧分别括注“巴基斯坦实际控制区”和“印度实际控制区”字样;

5.比例尺等于或小于1:2500万的地图,只画地区界、停火线,不注控制区和停火线注记;

6.比例尺等于或小于1:1亿的地图和1:2500万至1:1亿的专题地图,只画地区界,停火线可不表示;

7.“斯利那加”作一般城市表示,不作行政中心处理;

8.分国设色时,克什米尔不着色,在两控制区内沿停火线两侧和同中国接壤的地段,分别以印度和巴基斯坦的颜色作色带。

第十七条 有关地名注记表示规定:

俄罗斯境内以下地名必须括注中国名称,汉语拼音版地图和外文版地图除外:

1.“符拉迪沃斯托克”括注“海参崴”;

2.“乌苏里斯克”括注“双城子”;

3.“哈巴罗夫斯克”括注“伯力”;

4.“布拉戈维申斯克”括注“海兰泡”;

5.“萨哈林岛”括注“库页岛”;

6.“涅尔琴斯克”括注“尼布楚”;

7.“尼古拉耶夫斯克”括注“庙街”;

8.“斯塔诺夫山脉”括注“外兴安岭”。

其他地名表示:

1.长白山天池为中、朝界湖,湖名“长白山天池(白头山天池)”注国界内,不能简称“天池”;

2.西藏自治区门隅、珞瑜、下察隅地区附近的地名选取按1:400万公开地图表示;

3.香港特别行政区、澳门特别行政区、台湾省地名的外文拼写,采用当地拼写法。

第五章 其 他

第十八条 凡进口或引进、加工制作国外和港、澳、台地区的地图及附有中国地图图形产品必须遵守下列规定:

1.将中国国界线绘错或出现“一中一台”等问题的,必须修改;

2.地图文字内容(含语音部分)必须符合国家有关规定。

第十九条 互联网上使用的中国地图,以国家测绘局网站上的地图为准,国家测绘局网址为:http://www.sbsm.gov.cn。

第六章 附 则

第二十条 本规定由国家测绘局负责解释。

第二十一条 本规定自发布之日起施行。过去的有关规定,凡与本规定有抵触的,均按本规定执行。



测绘局网站 2003年5月23日

2009-08-31

2009-08-23

China's Policy in Border Disputes (i)

A few months ago Professor Fravel of MIT published a rather thorough study examining how China (since 1949, PRC) has handled its border disputes, and also some insight into forecasting its future behavior in border disputes, in a view to also shedding light to how states handle border disputes in general.

Foreign Affairs had a short book reviews in its April issue.

The publisher (Princeton Univeristy Press) has provided the introductory section for a free preview.

Prof Fravel has adopted a methodology which begins his analysis by defining the issues related to Taiwan and even HK/Macau as border disputes, which PRC has already put itself into a position that they are of a fundamentally different nature. Nevertheless, it appears Prof Fravel, beginning with a white sheet, has reached a conclusion which would be consistent with the alternative approach.

Boston.com has an interview (see below) with the author (by Harvard Crimson/Boston Globe), providing some insights into the Taiwan issue (which I largely agree). In particular, Prof Fravel discussed his view on the likelihood of a war related to territory (Taiwan is perhaps the only likely source as we all know), and dispelled the myth that China may launch a "diversionary war" (and perhaps diversionary wars in general in the world!). Prof Fravel believes, to the contrary, China is likely to make concession when there is internal pressure!

I have yet to acquire a copy of the book. But there are enough materials from PUP's introductory section which I hope to comment on in the next post.

Fig (click to enlarge): The border demarcated in 1960s with DPRK, shows the concession China yielded to North Korea, essentially giving up almost all the islands along Yalu River. (source)


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A talk with M. Taylor Fravel

An MIT scholar asks: What would make China use its army?

By Samuel P. Jacobs
August 10, 2008

AS THE WORLD'S attention focuses on China's first-ever Olympics, the country is staging a glossy, upbeat show of hospitality. But behind that surface of prosperity and welcome, China's government remains a secretive regime immensely preoccupied with its own security. Leaders worry about the country's vast borders and restive minority populations, threatened by resistance from groups in the western province of Xinjiang, by calls for Tibetan autonomy, and the persistent diplomatic standoff with Taiwan.

(Pat Greenhouse/Globe Staff)
In his new book, M. Taylor Fravel offers an intriguing argument about the relationship between instability within China and stability in the rest of the world.
The instrument for enforcing all this is China's military, the largest in the world - 2.3 million people - and one of a handful with the capacity to launch nuclear weapons. How, and when, China uses its military power is a serious concern in Asia and beyond, and one that will endure long after the Olympic torch has exited Beijing.

M. Taylor Fravel, a member of MIT's political science department and security studies program, has made a career of studying how, and when, China uses force. The 37-year-old professor, who spent two years of high school living in Taiwan, has combed through newly available documents from China's military academies and strategic thinkers. He has also examined nearly two dozen territorial disputes between China and its neighbors over the last six decades.

In a book to be published next month by Princeton University Press, "Strong Borders, Secure Nation," Fravel explains how China uses its military to protect the security of the ruling party, preserve the country's territorial integrity, police a 14,000-mile border that touches 14 countries, and keep Taiwan in check. He also offers an intriguing argument about the relationship between instability within China and stability in the rest of the world.

Ideas spoke with Fravel by phone and in his Cambridge office.

IDEAS: The focus of your upcoming book and much of your scholarship on China is on territorial disputes. Why study them?

FRAVEL: States have fought over territory more than any other issue. . . . The real question that is on many people's minds with respect to China is whether China will become a country that is highly likely to use force in resolving its international disputes. Territorial disputes provide one way to answer that question.

IDEAS: So how likely is China to use force?

FRAVEL: If you look at all of China's territorial disputes, you see that it's not especially prone to use force in these conflicts. One can tentatively infer from that that China is not necessarily highly prone to use force over other issues.

IDEAS: What would provoke China?

FRAVEL: The one specific issue - this is not terribly surprising at all - where China would use force under certain circumstances would be over Taiwan.

IDEAS: What would a Chinese attack on Taiwan look like?

FRAVEL: It depends on the political goal that China is trying to achieve. . . . The scenarios that are commonly discussed are a circle blockade of the island, which would be more of an effort to coerce Taiwan without engaging in direct armed combat. Another scenario is what is referred to as a decapitation strike, an effort to remove three-fourths of the leadership of Taiwan. A third scenario would be an amphibious assault on the island. However, many people view that as unlikely because amphibious assaults are hard to execute successfully. It would require probably more capability than China has.

(Pat Greenhouse/Globe Staff)
In his new book, M. Taylor Fravel offers an intriguing argument about the relationship between instability within China and stability in the rest of the world.
However force might be used across the Taiwan Strait, two points should be made. The first is that the use of force would be linked to some political goal, most likely preventing the island from completing what the mainland believes are important steps for the island to achieve political independence. . . . Second, if China were to use force across the Taiwan Strait, it would most likely try to limit conflict with United States.

IDEAS: What would the American response be like?

FRAVEL: If China used force across the Taiwan Strait? It would be a major crisis. . . . I don't think it would be a question of if the US would respond; the question would be how.

IDEAS: You challenge the accepted theory that China might launch a war to divert the attention of its population.

FRAVEL: The "diversionary war" argument posits that when leaders face threats to their political power at home, they are more likely to initiate or escalate a crisis abroad to divert attention of a dissatisfied public and rally society around the flag. What I found . . . is that when faced with ethnic unrest or legitimacy crises, the Chinese government has been more likely to cooperate in its territorial disputes in exchange for assistance in a domestic political problem that it faces.

A recent example of this would be China's efforts to compromise with neighbors in Central Asia in the 1990s over a range of disputed territories at precisely the time when Xinjiang, the Chinese autonomous region adjacent to the Central Asian republics, was experiencing a high degree of ethnic unrest. . . . China, I argue, traded concessions in the territorial disputes for assistance in improving border security, cracking down on dissident groups that were operating in areas neighboring China.

IDEAS: Are there examples of these "diversionary wars" from other countries?

FRAVEL: The paradigmatic case that many scholars cite is Argentina's decision to invade the Falkland Islands in 1982. . . . According to one theory, Argentina invades the Falklands to distract its dissatisfied population from internal difficulties and unite the country around a nationalist goal of unifying the islands.

IDEAS: What do your findings suggest for US policy toward China?

FRAVEL: China is not as prone to what we might call muscle-flexing as the increasing prominence of nationalism and patriotism might suggest.

IDEAS: What are some other American misperceptions about China?

FRAVEL: The challenge of governing China from the leadership perspective should not be underestimated. You've got approximately one-fifth of the world's population in an area roughly the size of the United States with perhaps as much cultural diversity as Western and Eastern Europe combined. . . . Just keeping the state together, much less growing at a rapid clip, such that you don't have a major episode of civil unrest or ethnic unrest, is a daunting political and administrative undertaking.

IDEAS: So the busier the Chinese are taking care of their affairs within the country, the less we have to worry about them?

FRAVEL: I'm not sure I would quite say that. If the majority of American attention looks at China's potential in the world, I would say that the majority of the leadership's attention in China is focused internally.

Samuel P. Jacobs is a senior at Harvard College and associate managing editor of The Harvard Crimson.

2009-08-22

The 15 movies that stick with me

Here are the 15 movies that I would still remember vividly years after watching -- in order

1. Casablanca (1942) (La marseilles vs Die Wacht am Rhein)
2. Oldboy (2003)
3. Battleship Potemkin Bronenosets Potyomkin (1925) (Odessa steps, and its descendants)
4. Mulholland Dr. (2001) (Teaser: I've told every little star)
5. Pulp Fiction (1994)
6. City on Fire Lung fu fong wan (1987) 龍虎風雲 (this started Taratino's career)
7. Red Sorghum Hong gao liang (1987) 紅高粱
8. The Cook the Thief His Wife & Her Lover (1989)
9. Devils on the Doorstep Guizi lai le (2000) 鬼子來了
10. As Tears Go By Wong gok ka moon (1988) 旺角卡門 (i only just learned of this alternative ending)
11. Blade Runner (1982)
12. Bicycle Thief Ladri di biciclette (1948)
13. Leon - the professional Léon (1994)
14. A Tale of Tales Skazka skazok (1979) (this short animation is available on youtube in 3 parts)
15. Vertigo (1958)

Of course, 15 is quite an artificial cut-off. there are more (after the 15 above):
Nabbeun namja (2001) (Bad Guy)
Most (1969) 橋
Zhavoronok (1964) 鬼戰車
The Usual Suspects (1994)
Shuang-Qi-Zhen daoke (1991) (雙旗鎮刀客)
A Better Tomorrow Ying hung boon sik (1986) 英雄本色
A zori zdes tikhie (1972) (這里黎明靜悄悄 The dawns here are quiet)
C'era una volta il West (1968) (Once upon a time in the west)
Da hong deng long gao gao gua (1991) 大紅燈籠高高掛
High Noon (1952)
Ballada o soldate (1959) (Ballad of a soldier)
Sai yau gei: Dai yat baak ling yat wui ji - Yut gwong bou haap (A Chinese Odyssey parts 1&2 西游記之月光寶盒,仙履奇緣)
Kill Bill: Vol. 1 (2003)
Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb (1964)
Il buono, il brutto, il cattivo. (1966) (the good, the bad and the ugly)
Ivanovo detstvo (1962) (the childhood of ivan)
Memento (2000)
Short Circuit (1986)
Zwartboek (2006) (Black Book)
Telmisseomding (1999) (Tell me something)
Tian mi mi (1996)
Paths of Glory (1957)
Das Boot (1981)
La dolce vita (1960)
Kagemusha (1980)
Se, jie (2007) (Lust, Caution 色 戒)
Bin-jip (2004) (3-iron)

2009-08-18

pictures from culture revolution

For more pictures see here.



2009-08-11

Internet "terrorism" in HK

Please see this for details. For the full story, see Hoiking blog, he said everything I wanted to say.

(update: see also tkma blog)

—————————————————–
反網絡暴力宣言
—————————————————–

  • 互聯網是自由媒介,所有網民都享有言論和思想自由,不容干涉。
  • 思想和言論自由,是香港社會的基石。網上網下,我輩都有責任好好維護這個權利。
  • 反對一切防礙網絡自由的行為,包括:
  1. 壓制甚至禁止反對意見
  2. 利用軟/硬手段,甚至恐嚇,去令反對聲音消失。

本人對網絡暴力行為深表遺憾,故貼此宣言,希望網上的言論自由和人身安全,得到保障。

一星期內,本博客將不作更新,以示抗議。


------

I would add one more point. In this blog, I would not even delete comments that disagree with me, even if they are stupid or absurd. The only comments I would delete are spam (e.g. wow gold link spams).

It is this simple, here we want to ensure

1) Freedom of expression

2) Freedom of choice to remain "anonymous" in the internet


The curious case of gender imbalance in Hong Kong



This chart is from an old post in Simonworld (where are you now Simon?).

It does not need much explanation. In 1990 There were more male than female across all age groups (till around 60 when men begin to die a lot faster). By 2005 (15 years later) the females outnumbered males VERY significantly.

For more critical minds, one cannot help but ask the question, how could there be so large a change in such a short time span? We are talking about a change from -7% to +33% in the 35-39 age group! i.e. in 1990 there are 107 men for every 100 women, 15 years later, it is 67 vs 100.

It must not be a result of "natural process". In fact, the female:male ratio at birth has been at a fairly stable 49:51 throughout the 1960s, and grew to 48:52 by 1980s and stabilized through this date (i suspect a small amount of selective abortion led to this rise), according to HK Government Census (you need to download excel format to see all the yearly data).

Another evidence that this is a "non-natural" process is revealed by the 35-39 cohort data in 2005, who were 20-24 in 1990, for every 100 men there were 96 women in 1990 but 133 in 2005! Where did these 37 people come from?

Well, it must be non-natural, which is immigration - emigration - death.

Death rate is small for younger age (typically under 1% as we can safely assume). Since one does not need to give up the residency in Hong Kong, emigration has no impact on HK ID card holder (but I am not exactly sure about this, which depends on the definition of the census). The reason must be deal to NET immigration.

How could this happen? Well, the most likely cause is, HK men married women from outside HK (mainly from mainland China). Therefore, if you read from news that it is a lot less likely for HK ladies to find a husband locally because of the gender imbalance, don't believe it. They are either confused or lying. The fact is: because HK men chose not to marry HK women (for various reasons), therefore there is a gender imbalance. The imbalance is not a cause to whatever phenomenon, it is merely a RESULT. Because of this choice by some men in HK, the gender ratio became imbalance. This is a significant difference. Kong girls cannot find a husband not because there are more Kong girls than Kong guys, but because Kong guys enlarged their target geographically while Kong girls did not (as much).

If one has the gender split of HK's immigration data, the myth of the gender imbalance would be easy to solve. Since I couldn't find such data, I had to do some calculation on my own. I took the population of each gender in an age group, e.g. 10-14, in 1991, "age them" by 5 year and compare with the age group 15-19 in 1996, and so on. The I calculated the % non-natural growth for each gender cohort for the years 1981-2006 (in 5 year increment). Finally I calculated the difference in these % non-natural growth. A high difference % means there is a significant difference in the non-natural growth (net immigration) between the two genders.

This is what I found.
(detailed calculation and related data (download from HK Census site) are here)



From the table, it is easy to see that the non-natural growth of female over male is much higher in the 20-40 age group. In fact, between 1991 to 2006 non-natural growth of female is higher than that of male at from 10.4% to 17.6% in the 20-30 age group.

(there are some other % that can be explained plausibly. e.g. the % in older age also shows a similar pattern, but that is because females live longer than male and therefore the base population of female is much higher, for 85+ group in 2006, female: male is 68:32. It is then not difficult to understand why the death RATE (per year, or per 5 year) for female is much lower than that of male)

--
p.s. (from commentator) please see pineapple farm's analysis 2 years ago (in chinese), I am basically repeating what he observed. pineapple farm also provided a link to the immigration statistics, which confirmed my hypothesis. You can see, for the 25-34 age group, women outnumbered men by around 10x, at 79499 vs 7940 from 2002 to 2006 (5 years net of 71559). From my calculation, non natural for the 5 year period is 61700 vs -3000, net=64700. The definition my be different as the age group shifts every single year plus there are immigration from other country and death/etc., so my estimate was pretty close.

2009-08-10

Tsugaru Strait: Japanese territorial claim is not always "greedy"



In an old post I blogged about Japan's territorial claim. I used this map (above) which shows how "greedy" it was in this respect. Well, "greedy" is a neutral word here. There is nothing wrong with it. Every country does so. China and the several SE Asian countries do so over South China Sea, US/Russia/Canada/Norway/Denmark(Greenland now) all tried to claim as much as they could over the Artic. You want to maximize your own interests before you go to a negotiation table. The only problem is that one often ends up in the situation of forcing oneself into a "non-negotiable" position as it is hard to explain any concession to one's citizen domestically (e.g. India today over the Sino-Indian border, and China at its secrecy over its border negotiation results)

Anyway, I just noticed that Japan's ocean claim is very "restrained" over the strait passages, in particular the Tsugaru Strait (i.e. between Honshu and Hokkaido), and also Tsusima and others. The reason, according to wiki, is quite simple, "Japan's territorial waters extend to three nautical miles (5.6 km) into the strait instead of the usual twelve, reportedly to allow nuclear-armed United States Navy warships and submarines to transit the strait without violating Japan's prohibition against nuclear weapons in its territory.[1]"

以下の図は、特定海域での領海の限界線を表示したものです(濃青色は内水を、青色は領海を 表しています)。For maps below, deep blue="internal water", blue=claimed sea border. I am not sure the technical difference between them though.

Soya (north of Hokkaido - subcumbed to USSR/Russian pressure and presence at Kuril)


Oosumi (South of Kyushu - facilitate US fleet passage)


Tsusima (Japan/Korea passage - facilitate US fleet passage)


Tsugaru (facilitate US fleet passage)


This is, of course, a product of the cold war and of the post-WWII situation of Japan, as a conquered state. Given time, Japan would like to normalize it, to at least the "normal" twelve nautical miles (and it is fair for it to do so).

The maps come from a post I found recently, commenting on a report that Chinese navy ships passing the Tsugaru strait late last year. Perhaps China wants US to respond to this, given the incidents of American spy planes and boats over the "international waters" just off Hainan on the edge of China's waters. America has been very silent on this event.
  • 中国戦闘艦の津軽海峡通過の意味

     津軽海峡の最狭部は、18.7kmです。日本における「特定海域」に指定されています。

      国連海洋法条約(1994年)では、同条約で定義された重要海峡での船舶・航空機への「通過通行権」が認められています。
     「通過通行権」とは、特定海域に指定された海峡での“迅速な通過を行う場合のみ”航行および上空通過を認める性質のものです。
     日本には国際海峡は5つ(宗谷海峡、津軽海峡、対馬海峡東水道(対馬海峡)、対馬海峡西水道(朝鮮海峡)、大隅海峡)存在しますが、それらは1977年の領海法によって定められたものであり、1994年の国連海洋法条約とは規定の経過が直接的に関係がありません。

     これらの海峡では領海が3海里(5.5km)に大幅に縮小されており、海峡の中央部は事実上公海となります。

     しかし、これらの海峡は、海上交通の要衝にあたることから、外国船舶にはこれらの海峡における通過通行権が認められ、外国艦艇には無害通航権が認められています。

     しかし、中国海軍は、近年、これらの海峡を通過する際に、無害通航、或いは迅速な通過を行っているとは言いがたいのが現状です。


Lucky whale, for escaping the fate of ending up on the sushi bar, or shall I say smart whale, for pretending to be a sub (pun)?

2009-08-07

Guo Jia (v) / 奉孝与隆中对

数年前介绍了一些郭嘉的战略思维,以及对时事实例的一些应用。这些例子对于熟悉三国和隆中对的人来说并不新鲜(所以用英语写了)。

其实战略思维的最高境界还是“不战而屈人之兵”。而这也是罗贯中三国演义的中心战略思想所在。当然“不战”是理想的状况,不过战略应用的最终目标还是如何以最低的代价获得最高的成果。(Strategy is all about leveraging external resources.) 而战略(strategy)和战术(tactic)的区别则在于战略是全盘全局而且是长远的,而且不同的战略选择之间的区别是质的而非量的区别。

回到郭嘉,熟悉三国的都知道曹操赤壁之战后的一句名言,“若奉孝在,决不使吾有此大失也!” 对于曹操为何如此怀念郭奉孝,一直都只想到表面的解释,比如郭嘉聪明、诤谏、受到曹的信任、等等。奉孝顶多是让曹操避免失败而已,也不一定会有制胜之道吧。

直到今天看到茶怪博的“马后炮”一文,才茅塞顿开。原来曹操是想到了奉孝对付二袁和公孙的战略,想到了其实赤壁之战的制胜之道,并不是“余勇追穷寇”,而是要分化敌人,避免敌人联手,然后逐个击破。

曹操之败,不是败于火攻,更不是败于借东风或林志玲,而是败于战略的失策。所以曹操若不是被胜利冲昏了头脑,本来该先整固荆州,等待孙刘内讧或逐个击破的。在多角逐鹿处境下,最最节省成本的战略就是借别人之力来协助成就己之目标。

这是隆中对(三分天下)精髓所在,也是罗贯中三国的精髓,郭嘉和诸葛亮不谋而合地理解了,曹操后来也理解了。可惜曹操的理解晚了。

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附注
1)郭嘉锦囊“今闻袁熙、袁尚往投辽东,明公切不可加兵。公孙康久畏袁氏吞并,二袁 往投必疑。若以兵击之,必并力迎敌,急不可下;若缓之,公孙康、袁氏必自相图: 其势然也。”
若把二袁替换为刘备,公孙康为孙权,两者何其想像!孙刘自相图,后来在荆州和夷陵也都一一应验了。
其实,根据三国志(见下),这个策略,郭嘉之前在判断刘备刘表,和袁谭袁尚之争以用过两次了。
三国志没有公孙和二袁之锦囊计,估计是罗贯中把袁谭袁尚之争移植到郭嘉逝后戏剧化之。不过,赤壁败后之言三国志也有记载“郭奉孝在,不使孤至此”

2)若没有火烧赤壁,曹操也没占到什么上风。按三国描述,曹军当时也是耗子看龟,无从下手。两军只会旷日持久的耗下去,直到另一个杨修发现新的鸡肋。曹操即使侥胜,必将元气大伤。(关于赤壁必败论,网上讨论不少,而且早有网民提出“赤壁的失败是战略错误而不是战术错误,而郭嘉正好是战略谋士而不是战术谋士。要他在的话,赤壁之战不是曹操会“打赢”,而是根本就不会打”。不过鲜有提到二袁公孙之典故。

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3) 原文

三國演義 第三十三回 曹丕乘乱纳甄氏 郭嘉遗计定辽东

... 操回至易州,重赏先曾谏者, 因谓众将曰:“孤前者乘危远征,侥幸成功。虽得胜,天所佑也,不可以为法。诸 君之谏,乃万安之计,是以相赏。后勿难言。”操到易州时,郭嘉已死数日,停柩 在公廨。操往祭之,大哭曰:“奉孝死,乃天丧吾也!”回顾众官曰:“诸君年齿 皆孤等辈,惟奉孝最少,吾欲托以后事,不期中年夭折,使吾心肠崩裂矣!”嘉之 左右,将嘉临死所封之书呈上,曰:“郭公临亡,亲笔书此,嘱曰:‘丞相若从书 中所言,辽东事定矣。’”操拆书视之,点头嗟叹,诸人皆不知其意。

次日,夏侯 dun引众人禀曰:“辽东太守公孙康久不宾服,今袁熙、袁尚又往投之,必为后患。 不如乘其未动,速往征之,辽东可得也。”操笑曰:“不烦诸公虎威,数日之后, 公孙康自送二袁之首至矣。”诸将皆不肯信。   

却 说袁熙、袁尚引数千骑奔辽东。辽东太守公孙康,本襄平人,武威将军公孙 度之子也。当日知袁熙、袁尚来投,遂聚本部属官商议此事。公孙恭曰:“袁绍在 日,尝有吞辽东之心。今袁熙、袁尚兵败将亡,无处依栖,来此相投,是鸠夺鹊巢 之意也。若容纳之,后必相图;不如赚入城中杀之,献头与曹公,曹公必重待我。” 康曰:“只怕曹操引兵下辽东,又不如纳二袁使为我助。”恭曰:“可使人探听: 如曹兵来攻,则留二袁;如其不动,则杀二袁,送与曹公。”康从之,使人去探消 息。   

却说袁熙、袁尚至辽东,二袁密议曰:“辽东军数 万骑,足可与曹操争衡。今 暂投之,后当杀公孙康而夺其地,养成气力而抗中原,可复河北也。”商议已定, 乃入见公孙康。康留于馆驿,只推有病,不即相见。不一日,细作回报:“曹操兵 屯易州,并无下辽东之意。”公孙康大喜,乃先伏刀斧手于壁衣中,使二袁入。相 见礼毕,命坐。时天气严寒,尚见床榻上无●褥,谓康曰:“愿铺坐席。”康目 言曰:“汝二人之头,将行万里,何席之有!”尚大惊。康叱曰:“左右何不下手!” 刀斧手拥出,就坐席上砍下二人之头,用木匣盛贮,使人送到易州来见曹操。时操 在易州,按兵不动。夏侯dun、张辽入禀曰:“如不下辽东,可回许都,恐刘表生心。” 操曰:“待二袁首级至,即便回兵。”众皆暗笑。

忽报辽东公孙康遣人送袁熙、袁 尚首级至,众皆大惊。使者呈上书信,操大笑曰:“不出奉孝之料!”重赏来使, 封公孙康为襄平侯、左将军。众官问曰:“何为不出奉孝之所料?”操遂出郭嘉书 以示之。书略曰:     
今闻袁熙、袁尚往投辽东,明公切不可加兵。公孙康久畏袁氏吞并,二袁 往投必疑。若以兵击之,必并力迎敌,急不可下;若缓之,公孙康、袁氏必自相图: 其势然也。
众皆踊跃称善。操引众官复设祭于郭嘉灵前。亡年三十八岁,从征伐十有一年,多 立奇勋。
后人有诗赞曰:     
天生郭奉孝,豪杰冠群英。     
腹内藏经史,胸中隐甲兵。     
运谋如范蠡,决策似陈平。     
可惜身先死,中原梁栋倾。

4) 三国志

郭嘉字奉孝,颍川阳翟人也。傅子曰:嘉少有远量。汉末天下将乱。自弱冠匿名迹,密交结英隽,不与俗接,故时人多莫知,惟识达者奇之。年二十七,辟司徒府。初, 北见袁绍,谓绍谋臣辛评、郭图曰:“夫智者审于量主,故百举百全而功名可立也。袁公徒欲效周公之下士,而未知用人之机。多端寡要,好谋无决,欲与共济天下 大难,定霸王之业,难矣!”于是遂去之。先是时,颍川戏志才,筹画士也,太祖甚器之。早卒。太祖与荀彧书曰:“自志才亡后,莫可与计事者。汝、颍固多奇 士,谁可以继之?” 彧荐嘉。召见,论天下事。太祖曰:“使孤成大业者,必此人也。”嘉出,亦喜曰:“真吾主也。”表为司空军祭酒。傅 子曰:太祖谓嘉曰:“本初拥冀州之众,青、并从之,地广兵强,而数为不逊。吾欲讨之,力不敌,如何?”对曰:“刘、项之不敌,公所知也。汉祖唯智胜;项羽 虽强,终为所禽。嘉窃料之,绍有十败,公有十胜,虽兵强,无能为也。绍繁礼多仪,公体任自然,此道胜一也。绍以逆动,公奉顺以率天下,此义胜二也。汉末政 失于宽,绍以宽济宽,故不摄,公纠之以猛而上下知制,此治胜三也。绍外宽内忌,用人而疑之,所任唯亲戚子弟,公外易简而内机明,用人无疑,唯才所宜,不间 远近,此度胜四也。绍多谋少决,失在后事,公策得辄行,应变无穷,此谋胜五也。绍因累世之资,高议揖让以收名誉,士之好言饰外者多归之,公以至心待人,推 诚而行,不为虚美,以俭率下,与有功者无所吝,士之忠正远见而有实者皆原为用,此德胜六也。绍见人饥寒,恤念之形于颜色,其所不见,虑或不及也,所谓妇人 之仁耳,公于目前小事,时有所忽,至于大事,与四海接,恩之所加,皆过其望,虽所不见,虑之所周,无不济也,此仁胜七也。绍大臣争权,谗言惑乱,公御下以 道,浸润不行,此明胜八也。绍是非不可知,公所是进之以礼,所不是正之以法,此文胜九也。绍好为虚势,不知兵要,公以少克众,用兵如神,军人恃之,敌人畏 之,此武胜十也。”太祖笑曰:“如卿所言,孤何德以堪之也!”嘉又曰:“绍方北击公孙瓒,可因其远征,东取吕布。不先取布,若绍为寇,布为之援,此深害 也。”太祖曰:“然。”

征吕布,三战破之,布退固守。时士卒疲倦,太祖欲引军还,嘉说太祖急攻之,遂禽布。语在荀攸传。傅 子曰:太祖欲引军还,嘉曰:“昔项籍七十馀战,未尝败北,一朝失势而身死国亡者,恃勇无谋故也。今布每战辄破,气衰力尽,内外失守。布之威力不及项籍,而 困败过之,若乘胜攻之,此成禽也。”太祖曰:“善。”魏书曰:刘备来奔,以为豫州牧。或谓太祖曰:“备有英雄志,今不早图,后必为患。”太祖以问嘉,嘉 曰:“有是。然公提剑起义兵,为百姓除暴,推诚仗信以招俊杰,犹惧其未也。今备有英雄名,以穷归己而害之,是以害贤为名,则智士将自疑,回心择主,公谁与 定天下?夫除一人之患,以沮四海之望,安危之机,不可不察!”太祖笑曰:“君得之矣。”傅子曰:初,刘备来降,太祖以客礼待之,使为豫州牧。嘉言于太祖 曰:“备有雄才而甚得众心。张飞、关羽者,皆万人之敌也,为之死用。嘉观之,备终不为人下,其谋未可测也。古人有言:‘一日纵敌,数世之患。’宜早为之 所。”是时,太祖奉天子以号令天下,方招怀英雄以明大信,未得从嘉谋。会太祖使备要击袁术,嘉与程昱俱驾而谏太祖曰:“放备,变作矣!”时备已去,遂举兵 以叛。太祖恨不用嘉之言。案魏书所云,与傅子正反也。

孙策转斗千里,尽有江东,闻太祖与袁绍相持于官渡,将渡江北袭许。众闻皆惧,嘉料之曰:“策新并江东,所诛皆英豪雄杰,能得人死力者也。然策轻而无备,虽有百万之众,无异于独行中原也。若刺客伏起,一人之敌耳。以吾观之,必死于匹夫之手。”策临江未济,果为许贡客所杀。傅 子曰:太祖欲速征刘备,议者惧军出,袁绍击其后,进不得战而退失所据。语在武纪。太祖疑,以问嘉。嘉劝太祖曰:“绍性迟而多疑,来必不速。备新起,众心未 附,急击之必败。此存亡之机,不可失也。”太祖曰:“善。”遂东征备。备败奔绍,绍果不出。臣松之案武纪,决计征备,量绍不出,皆出自太祖。此云用嘉计, 则为不同。又本传称(自)嘉料孙策轻佻,必死于匹夫之手,诚为明于见事。然自非上智,无以知其死在何年也。今正以袭许年死,此盖事之偶合。

从破袁绍,绍死,又从讨谭、尚于黎阳,连战数克。诸将欲乘胜遂攻之,嘉曰:“袁绍爱此二子,莫适立也。有郭图、逢纪为之谋臣,必交斗其间,还相离 也。急之则相持,缓之而后争心生。不如南向荆州若征刘表者,以待其变;变成而后击之,可一举定也。”太祖曰:“善。”乃南征。军至西平,谭、尚果争冀州。 谭为尚军所败,走保平原,遣辛毗乞降。太祖还救之,遂从定邺。又从攻谭于南皮,冀州平。封嘉洧阳亭侯。傅子曰:河北既平,太祖多辟召青、冀、幽、并知名之士,渐臣使之,以为省事掾属。皆嘉之谋也。

太祖将征袁尚及三郡乌丸,诸下多惧刘表使刘备袭许以讨太祖,嘉曰:“公虽威震天下,胡恃其远,必不设备。因其无备,卒然击之,可破灭也。且袁绍有恩 于民夷,而尚兄弟生存。今四州之民,徒以威附,德施未加,舍而南征,尚因乌丸之资,招其死主之臣,胡人一动,民夷俱应,以生蹋顿之心,成觊觎之计,恐青、 冀非己之有也。表,坐谈客耳,自知才不足以御备,重任之则恐不能制,轻任之则备不为用,虽虚国远征,公无忧矣。”太祖遂行。至易,嘉言曰:“兵贵神速。今 千里袭人,辎重多,难以趣利,且彼闻之,必为备;不如留辎重,轻兵兼道以出,掩其不意。”太祖乃密出卢龙塞,直指单于庭。虏卒闻太祖至,惶怖合战。大破 之,斩蹋顿及名王已下。尚及兄熙走辽东。

嘉深通有算略,达于事情。太祖曰:“唯奉孝为能知孤意。”年三十八,自柳城还,疾笃,太祖问疾者交错。及薨,临其丧,哀甚,谓荀攸等曰:“诸君年皆 孤辈也,唯奉孝最少。天下事竟,欲以后事属之,而中年夭折,命也夫!”乃表曰:“军祭酒郭嘉,自从征伐,十有一年。每有大议,临敌制变。臣策未决,嘉辄成 之。平定天下,谋功为高。不幸短命,事业未终。追思嘉勋,实不可忘。可增邑八百户,并前千户。”魏 书载太祖表曰:“臣闻褒忠宠贤,未必当身,念功惟绩,恩隆后嗣。是以楚宗孙叔,显封厥子;岑彭既没,爵及支庶。故军祭酒郭嘉,忠良渊淑,体通性达。每有大 议,发言盈庭,执中处理,动无遗策。自在军旅,十有馀年,行同骑乘,坐共幄席,东禽吕布,西取眭固,斩袁谭之首,平朔土之众,逾越险塞,荡定乌丸,震威辽 东,以枭袁尚。虽假天威,易为指麾,至于临敌,发扬誓命,凶逆克殄,勋实由嘉。方将表显,短命早终。上为朝廷悼惜良臣,下自毒恨丧失奇佐。宜追增嘉封,并 前千户,褒亡为存,厚往劝来也。”谥曰贞侯。子奕嗣。魏书称奕通达见理。奕字伯益,见王昶家诫。

后太祖征荆州还,于巴丘遇疾疫,烧船,叹曰:“郭奉孝在,不使孤至此。”傅子曰:太祖又云:“哀哉奉孝!痛哉奉孝!惜哉奉孝!”初,陈群非嘉不治行检,数廷诉嘉,嘉意自若。太祖愈益重之,然以群能持正,亦悦焉。傅 子曰:太祖与荀彧书,追伤嘉曰:“郭奉孝年不满四十,相与周旋十一年,阻险艰难,皆共罹之。又以其通达,见世事无所凝滞,欲以后事属之,何意卒尔失之,悲 痛伤心。今表增其子满千户,然何益亡者,追念之感深。且奉孝乃知孤者也;天下人相知者少,又以此痛惜。奈何奈何!”又与彧书曰:“追惜奉孝,不能去心。其 人见时事兵事,过绝于人。又人多畏病,南方有疫,常言‘吾往南方,则不生还’。然与共论计,云当先定荆。此为不但见计之忠厚,必欲立功分,弃命定。事人心 乃尔,何得使人忘之!”奕为太子文学,早薨。子深嗣。深薨,子猎嗣。世语曰:嘉孙敞,字泰中,有才识,位散骑常侍。